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AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL INQUIRY OF SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE 
                                         Tijani Kehinde Olusegun 
Abstract:  This study explores some theoretical issues in scientific research such as, the nature 
of experimentation and problems of methodology in scientific practice as well as the question 
of truth, rationality, objectivity and utility of scientific discoveries. The paper discusses a 
number of theorizing that have emerged in response to the challenge raised by the above 
concerns. Epistemological models of science from critical rationalists, like Popper, Kuhn, 
Feyerabend and the neo-pragmatic methodological orientation of Arthur Fine’s Natural 
Ontological Attitude (NOA) to Science, have been adopted as points of discussion on what 
science as an empirical discipline entail. The paper concludes that a rigorous epistemological 
discussion on the methodology of scientific inquiry is a desideratum for the progress of science. 
Keywords: Scientific Knowledge, Experimentation, Objectivity, Truth, Falsifiability, Natural 
Ontological Attitude (NOA), Normal Science, Anarchism.  
Introduction 
If the epistemological concerns about the methodologies of scientific inquiry were defined by 
a mere description of scientific practice, especially when research is conducted, then the issue 
would have been easy to address. However, this is clearly not the case. A major reason the 
problem of scientific methodology has remained contentious till today is the nature of the 
problem of science itself. It is not gainsaid that scientific research involves a laborious process. 
As a result, any attempt to systematically demonstrate its procedures of inquiry cannot be a 
minor task. Moreover, the methods of scientific inquiry cannot be well construed by solely 
describing the activities of scientists because any form of description must itself be selective, 
and hence, cannot furnish the whole image of what is described. When philosophy interrogates 
the basic tenets of science, epistemological, ontological as well as normative issues ensues, 
which overshadows the conditions of mere descriptive exercises. 
This paper raises some epistemological issues involved in the practices and methodologies of 
scientific research. Tellingly, critical appraisals of how and why science operates have 
implications to the manner in which scientists should conduct their research if their enterprise 
is to thrive. In this work, we shall expound some of the inherent attributes of scientific research 
and discuss a few methodological perspectives to the nature of truth and objectivity in science, 
all of which have surfaced from the rigorous philosophical inquiry on the heuristic nature of 
the subject. 
What the Method of Scientific Inquiry Entails 
Articulating the constituents and procedures of scientific methodology is oftentimes a daunting 
task. This is particularly so, because the possible objects of scientific knowledge are not in situ 
spelled out. As Cornelius Benjamin rightly points out “one cannot say before science has begun 
what the possible objects of science are, for one can know whether an object is scientific only 
by trying to know it scientifically”.1 However, we can make an attempt at conceptualizing the 
matter at hand. So construed, scientific method is an experimental process of knowledge 
acquisition which entails painstaking and rigorous observation; formulating hypothesis based 
on such observations through inductive process; testing and measuring of deductions drawn 
from the hypothesis, and refinement of the hypothesis based on the experimental findings.2 
Stated otherwise, the process of scientific methodology entails making hypothesis, deducing 
predictions from them as logical derivatives and then follow through with experimental 
observations based on the prediction made. 
There is an expansive belief that scientific research begins with observation. Perhaps, this belief 
is a natural one since science as an empirical discipline is expected to explicate phenomena as 
it occurs around us. This sentiment has however, come under severe criticism ever since 
Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1781) was published. Scientists have now come to 
                                                 
1 Cornelius Benjamin, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937),3.  
2 See Wikipedia, Scientific Method. Available at: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/scientific-method. 
the realization that scientific research cannot be embarked on by merely “studying or observing 
the fact”; no scientific research can be initiated unless some anomalies are identified in real 
life-world. Sir Isaac Newton, we are told, was propelled to formulate the law of Universal 
Gravitation (UG) by the falling of an apple from its tree. Of course, apples have been falling 
down before Newton was born and people have been seeing it fall without attaching any 
significance to the happening. The capacity to sense problems in the physical world, 
particularly problems whose solution have rippling effects on the solution of other anomalies, 
is a mark of scientific ingenuity. It is thus, an undeniable fact that scientific research oftentimes 
begins with some anomaly, and “aim at an order that links what may superficially seem to be 
unrelated facts”.3 
As soon as the researcher has found a problem, he could make a tentative solution of the 
problem he has singled out. Here, cognizance and familiarity with the subject matter becomes 
very significant. For the fact, no scientist can even state the problem except he is well 
acquainted with the subject at hand. To clarify this point, an example can be gleaned from the 
history of science. In November 8, 1895, the German physicist Wilhelm Conrad Röentgen 
intercepted a burgeoning experiment on cathode-ray phenomena based on the glimmer of a 
barium platinocyanide screen somewhere in his laboratory. He did so because he not only saw 
that the blaze was an anomaly but also because he perceived it as a significant problem needing 
further examination. Having a working knowledge of the character of cathode rays, Röentgen 
formulated the hypothesis that the illumination was as a result of a new form of radiation 
dissimilar to cathode rays. Notably, only few scientific breakthroughs have exerted an 
immediate impact as Röentgen’s discovery of X-rays as this caused an instantaneous revolution 
in the fields of physics and medicine.  
Suffice it to say that not all conjectures as conceived by the researcher are pertinent to a 
particular problem. Still on the example given earlier, Roentgen did not identify the cause of 
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the radiation he noticed with the form or size of the instrument he was using at the time of his 
research, owing to the fact that there is no such causal relation between the form or size of the 
scientific equipment he used during the experiment which involves cathode rays and the glitter 
of barium platinocyanide screen. While some philosophers like Francis Bacon and John Stuart 
Mill hold the view that there are rules guiding scientific discoveries, facts have revealed that 
these rules cannot sensu stricto, be mechanically adopted to arrive at causal connections 
between events in the phenomena world. If there were standing rules which can lead to 
scientific discoveries, then the task of the scientist would have made easier. Invariably, issues 
about causal relation are usually issues about relevant hypothesis. As noted earlier, the scientist 
must be versed with the sort of causal nexus which the issue under investigation is capable of 
revealing in order to arrive at relevant hypothesis. It will be a mere waste of time if he thinks 
that he can arrive at a scientific discovery by the strict application of a set of rules.  
 
Having got the relevant hypothesis, the scientist could then begin to gather additional facts 
which could be harbingers of the final solution. And it should not be surprising to find such a 
hypothesis different from the solution to the problem4. Fundamentally, scientific research 
begins with some facts which is considered by a scientist as problematic. However, these 
collections of facts are usually not enough to ensure that the researcher postulate a 
comprehensive explanation for them. Yet, they provide some preliminary hypothesis that 
would foster the search for additional facts. Roentgen gathered more facts to his preliminary 
hypothesis, having discovered that the effect he observed during the experiment on cathode 
rays was somewhat, a new form of radiation very similar to light. 
It should be noted that a preliminary hypothesis and the collection of additional facts play 
interdependent roles and as such, they are inseparable. Rigorous scientific research demands a 
preliminary hypothesis to delineate the facts, but the added facts may evoke new hypotheses, 
                                                 
4 Iving Copi, et.al, Introduction to Logic, (New York: Macmillan, 1994),543.  
which may culminate to new facts, and these new facts could in turn suggest other hypotheses, 
etc. 
As his research progresses, the scientist would come to a stage where he realises that the major 
facts needed for problem solving are available. Roentgen – who announced his discovery after 
seven active days – felt that he had a hypothesis that explained the data at his disposal. In order 
to formulate a more viable hypothesis that explains the initial problem and additional facts 
deduced from experiments, the scientists must thoroughly reflect. The culmination of such 
reflection, if prosperous, would be a scientific theory that provide an account for the available 
data. Invariably, all explanatory theories of science involve a creative process of both intuition, 
imagination and knowledge.  
What is more, scientists are usually not satisfied with laws or theories that describe only those 
facts that were initially considered during the process of carrying out research; they usually 
fancy theories that go beyond the incipient data to the new ones whose awareness in lieu of 
subsisting scientific knowledge would have been unprecedented. This procedure entails a 
deductive development leading to further consequences. Scientists and epistemologists of 
science alike, place a lot of value on the explanatory prowess of scientific propositions, and 
this connotes that added facts should be derived from a sound theory with predictive value. 
From Roentgen’s discovery that the reason behind the radiation was not the cathode rays but a 
new radiation comparable to light, he predicted some elements of the new radiation having 
discovered them already. 
To ensure the scientific researcher is on the right track, the procedure of deducing testable 
consequences from a scientific must be well entrenched. This becomes very important for 
scientists because it helps them to bring to bear the hidden assumptions which can be 
empirically verified. For instance, Roentgen spent quality time investigating the constituents 
of the X-rays he predicted in the course of his examinations due to the point that scientific 
experiments are performed to test the effects of theories in addition to initial situations. Indeed, 
scientists emphasize more on theories that help them discover and infer a greater sort of true 
propositions. Seeing that no scientific theory can be authenticated as wholly true, as it is at best 
contingent upon subsequent research, we can infer that theories with more predictive value and 
better demonstrated causal nexus between heretofore unconnected phenomena are preferred to 
ones with less predictive potency of such causal links. 
Our discussion so far connects more to the theoretical issues of scientific method in the quest 
to provide a well-seated understanding and explanation of the phenomena. But both theory and 
practice go hand in hand; theoretical issues about science are intricately connected to its 
practical problems, and vice-versa. Thus, when scientists postulate theories to capture 
phenomena these propositions usually have practical bearings. Tellingly, Roentgen’s discovery 
and explanation of X-ray have been useful in addressing several practical problems; for 
instance, in medicine, X-rays have been used in the diagnosis and treatment of certain diseases. 
In most cases in science, anomalies engender theoretical development, and some theories are 
wittingly developed with the eagerness to provide answers to some questions and problems 
arising from the phenomenal world.  
Nature of Scientific Experimentation and Objectivity 
As mentioned earlier, scientific research is initiated by problems and these problems are not 
unconnected with some facts which the scientist considers as problematic. Although H.I. 
Brown5 warns that observation of empirical fact is a complex venture, scientific research as an 
empirical discipline must fundamentally make connection with the phenomenal world through 
a careful method of observation. In our lived experiences in the world, the sense organs enable 
us to perceive matter within the background of our linguistically-mediated existence. 
Nonetheless, much as common observation and scientific observation are influenced via the 
senses, the latter goes beyond mere sensation and perception of things to the development of 
scientific equipment and instruments in order to detect that which mere sensation cannot readily 
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perceive. This heuristic innovation has profound influence on the nature of scientific 
experimentation. 
The process of scientific observation is conducted within the ambience of a theory (or 
sometimes theories) and this procedure is demonstrated in a number of ways: first, it suggests 
the kinds of items that exist; second, it reveals the appropriate equipment for observing them 
and, thirdly, it demonstrates how we are to construe the collected data from the instruments 
which helps observation. For instance, the discovery of the electron neutrino in 1959 by Clyde 
Cowan and Fred Reines6 aptly illustrates the close connection between theory and scientific 
observation. It also underscores the complexity in upholding a strict distinction between 
observable and unobservable elements in scientific observation. With the advancement in 
scientific knowledge, better scientific equipment are devised to make the hitherto unobservable 
elements discernible. At a time in the history of science atoms, electrons, etc., were considered 
unobservables; now it is no longer the case as scientists conceive them as visible. But how can 
we justify this change in lieu of scientific practice? In his article: “Experimentation and 
Scientific Realism”, Ian Hacking gave an interesting response to this question when he noted 
that: 
                          …it is not even that (scientists) use electrons to 
experiments on something else that makes it impossible 
to doubt electrons. Understanding some causal 
properties of electrons, you guess how to build a very 
ingenious complex devise that enables you to line up 
electrons the way you want, in order to see what will 
happen to something else.7 
 
Ian Hacking’s position is a pointer to a discussion of the role experiments plays in scientific 
research. As an enterprise with a major objective to explain the world, science must be firmly 
rooted in experiments because it is the experimental procedures of research that guarantee that 
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Reality, (London & Hampshire: Macmillan, 1997),164. 
scientific theorizing sustain contact with the physical world. Scientific experimentation is a 
serious business as it takes, in some cases, a long period of data analysis to come up with useful 
information that scientist can utilise. Experimentation in science is a sifting process which 
furnishes “a reliable way of checking our empirical conjectures about the objective world”.8 
This process itself is grounded on measurements. Measurement is a well-structured process for 
scientific quantification of material nature targeted at enhancing the level of “reasonable 
agreement” between nature and theory.9 When a discrepancy is noticed between the results of 
measurements and the numbers predicted with the aid of theories, it is required of the scientists 
to carefully identify the source of the problem. Generally, scientific research can be marked as 
a tasking and well-structured activity aimed at providing the necessary background for future 
scientific breakthroughs and entrenching the horizon of objectivity. Doubtless, measurement is 
an essential tool for such exercise. 
Objectivity is a structural component of scientific methodology. So construed, it is “a value 
that informs how science is practiced and how scientific truths are discovered”.10 In an attempt 
to unravel truth about the physical world, the scientist must aspire to eliminate prior 
commitments, emotional biases, etc.11 Objectivity is frequently associated with the property of 
scientific measurement as the precision of a measurement can be verified independent of the 
scientific researcher. Thus, objectivity is closely knitted to the purpose of testability and 
reproducibility. For the results of measurement to be considered objective, it must be 
transmitted and made public. In effect, objectivity is preserved by the social and public 
character of science which imposes a mental discipline on the scientific researcher. However, 
epistemological concerns are raised as to the extent and nature of objectivity and truth in 
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9 Thomas Kuhn, The Essential Tension, (Chicago: Chicago University Press ltd, 1977),184. 
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science. Since the process of object selection and measurement are ordinarily subjective and 
the results of that particular process are universalized to a broader system from which the object 
of study was selected, the conjectures are unavoidably prejudiced. Thus, while carrying out 
research, the scientist is expected to implement his research activity in agreement with the 
benchmarks of intersubjective process obtainable for himself and members of the scientific 
community.   
Epistemological Models of Scientific Methodology 
Arising from epistemological discussion of science are a number of ideologies of scientific 
method which can enhance our understanding of the operations of science. Owing to the 
remarkable achievement of science in interpreting the world, there is an expansive view that 
there must be something distinct about science which distinguishes it from other seemingly 
unscientific disciplines, such as psychoanalysis, astrology or even philosophy. Commend 
philosophers, they have, in many cases, addressed the criterion of demarcation between science 
and pseudo-science in a rational and essentialist manner in order to provide an adequate 
characterization of science. 
The logical positivists, otherwise known as members of the Vienna circle, held that scientists 
attempt to justify the view that scientific knowledge is the only accurate kind of knowledge 
and that all traditional metaphysical books are to be set ablaze as its doctrines are meaningless. 
In effect, they proposed the verification criterion of meaning as the distinguishing factor for 
demarcating strict science from nonscience. They emphasized the process of induction through 
the accumulation of confirmed and verified empirical fact. The implication is that through 
continuous accumulation of this sort of evidence science progresses towards truth and 
objectivity which can be evaluated by probability calculus. Karl Popper refutes this inductivist 
explanatory model of science which illustrates that the increasing probability of scientific 
theories based on the accumulation of confirmed cases of a theory applicable to the available 
evidence as a mark of the predictive success of science. Thus, Popper prefers the hypothetico-
deductive method to induction. For him, science proceeds by conjectures and refutation; and 
falsifiability rather than verifiability is the demarcating criterion between science and pseudo-
science. Although the goal of science is to seek truth and objectivity, Popper thinks the scientist 
cannot be certain that he has arrived at truth until it is falsifiable and properly tested. A theory 
is said to be scientific if it can yield a prediction that contradicts experimental observations, 
that is, if it is testable or refutable in principle. A better way to enhance the growth of scientific 
knowledge is for scientists to formulate bold hypothesis that must be subjected to testing after 
which it is corroborated having passed the severe test. Popper’s prerequisite for science ”is for 
it to be singled out, once and for all in a positive sense but that its logical form shall be such 
that it can be singled out by means of empirical test”.12 Hence, the rationality of science is to 
be found in its refutability (falsifiability) and testability.     
Popper’s hypothetico-deductive model of science has some merits. Firstly, it furnishes a 
moderate view of scientific progress in terms of increasing verisimilitude (tentative truth) 
rather than by attaining certainty in scientific knowledge. Secondly, it places science on a sound 
rational ground than does the inductive methodology of science. Thirdly, falsification is a more 
organized way of addressing the problem of demarcation between science and nonscience. 
However, Popper’s view on the method of scientific inquiry has been criticised as his 
propositions run contrary to the existing procedure of scientific research. One, Popper was not 
consistent in his refutation of induction. As a matter of fact, falsification and corroboration 
possess elements of induction. This is precisely so because in an attempt to falsify or 
corroborate a hypothesis, we must proceed using the inductive method. As Feigl poignantly 
notes, “it is only by induction that we can assume that a well-refuted theory will be refuted”.13 
Second, while we commend Popper for his criticism of the logical positivist on the ground of 
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the criterion of demarcation which they identified with the verification principle, it should be 
stated that Popper’s prescription was neither plausible because purely metaphysical 
propositions do not need to be falsified or corroborated by empirical testing as is the case of 
scientific conjectures. Generally, falsification as a principle of scientific inquiry raises more 
problems than it could solve. In real scientific practice, evidences are gathered by a scientist to 
strengthen his hypothesis not refute it.14   
The inadequacies of the hypothetico-deductive model based on the principle of falsification 
have culminated in a historical angle to the philosophy of science. A major proponent of the 
historical theory of science is Thomas Kuhn. He points that a number of antagonistic 
explanatory models of the phenomenal world must exist before science as an empirical 
discipline can emerge. This period of theoretical mutiny ends as soon as one of the contending 
theories either provide answers to a difficult question which its rivals could not figure out. 
Normal science commences when the overarching explanation becomes accessible and 
accepted through some kind of consensus. So construed, normal science is research strongly 
rooted in past scientific successes, one which the scientific community recognized as the 
tentative foundation for future scientific practice. The primary aim of normal science is the 
disciplinary paradigm whose basic features are: “(a) symbolic generalizations, such as f=ma, 
E=mc2 etc. (b) models, such as the depiction of an atom as a miniature solar system and (c) 
exemplars, which are concrete problem solutions accepted by scientists in a particular domain 
as providing the template for solving other related problems”.15  
Normal science progresses continuous refinements of the problems as well as the solutions 
which is actualized within the ambient of a disciplinary matrix which functions as the 
architecture for solving puzzles. However, a problem can degenerate into an anomaly which is 
further worsened into crisis; extraordinary science emerges when a theory successfully solves 
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this crisis. At the same time, scientists do not rescind a theory except a better one is formulated. 
In determining between conflicting theories, logical and empirical considerations are relevant, 
though not determinative and they are enhanced by the consensus and sociology of 
commitment. 
Kuhn adumbrates a revolutionary insight into the methodology of scientific inquiry which can 
be arrived at by addressing the methodological issues of science historically. He construes 
consensus as the touchstone scientific research which is practiced by scientists during normal 
science. Critics, however, have argued that it is difficult to see this level of consensus during 
normal science as Kuhn would have us believe. Kuhn has also been accused of wrongly 
underrating the utility of empirical and logical factors in deciding between competing 
alternative theories in science. Though the application of logical and empirical standard in 
choosing between theories are problematic, many scientists have been able to manage such 
difficulties, without abandoning completely these criteria. 
Owing to the various disagreements amongst philosophers of science on what constitutes the 
core of scientific methodology, some scholars have proposed an epistemological anarchist view 
of scientific research. For instance, Paul Feyerabend has proposed this unconventional kind of 
view. He was very critical of Popper and Kuhn. In his view, if Popper’s methodological 
proposition is applied resolutely, it will shut out science without substituting it with an 
alternative. Feyerabend also sees Kuhn’s ideas as too obscure to engender any substantial 
methodology of science. In his work: Against Method16, Feyerabend, himself an “irrationalist”, 
proposes what we now call the state of anarchy and disunity in science. Science, for not a 
unified system but a collage in no need for methodology as it is, more or less, an impediment 
to the growth of science. Put differently, science is not one thing, but a collection of various 
research traditions, theories and practices. Instead of the principle of consensus and tenacity 
which Kuhn proposed, Feyerabend advocates the principle of anarchism which ensures 
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scientific progress. He reminds us of how various non-western cultures of the world had made 
remarkable advancement in the areas of technology, medicine, etc., without recourse to the 
methodology of science.     
Feyerabend has excelled in bringing our attention to the issues we are likely to encounter if the 
methodological procedures of science are taking sensu stricto.  His unconventional orientation 
of science is a functional corrective to the devastating influence of ‘competent’ intelligentsias 
on people’s lives, making them slaves of their own existence. 
Feyerabend erroneously exaggerates by placing antiquated practices and superstitious beliefs 
on a similar pedestal with modern science. It is foolhardy to think that the successes of scientific 
knowledge over other es is largely due to ideological situations that support science. Contrary 
to this view, science has abundantly improved our knowledge of material nature over millennia, 
and through its usage of technology, it has modified the nature of our heuristic exercises to a 
level unequalled by prior methodological orientations. The principles of verification, 
predictability and coherence are intrinsically connected with the advancement of science in 
explaining the natural world. Moreover, Feyerabend’s theory of “anything goes” is spurious. 
If taken to heart, nothing will be taken out of science. A sorcerer, for example, could claim to 
be a scientist; an astronomer need not go beyond the Bible to investigate the solar system and 
heavenly bodies. Thus, it can be easily gleaned from the above that progress in science is 
marked by the fact that some methodologies are more pragmatic in explaining the workings of 
nature, though they do not authenticate certainty, truth and objectivity. 
In an attempt to address the nature of truth and objectivity in science, some neo-pragmatic 
methodological approaches to science have evolved. One such methodological orientation is 
the Natural Ontological Attitude (NOA) to science advanced by the philosopher of science, 
Arthur Fine. The NOA is a minimalist thesis with three distinct, but correlated parts: (a) its 
investigation of the realism-antirealism contention which influences the shift towards 
minimalism and hermeneutics. (b) its overwhelming anti-essentialist perspective on the 
ontology of science. (c) its antirepresentational orientation of truth and objectivity. NOA 
attempts to resolve the realism-antirealism debate by upholding the view that they both furnish 
insights towards understanding the practice of science, though their interpretations are 
unwarranted. Fine attributes to realism and antirealism, the constant insistence that science 
requires interpretation and totalizing narratives in order to be authenticated. Just as we rely on 
our senses as a means of substantiating the constituents of quotidian experiences, so too do we 
accept science and its system of inquiry.17 NOA demands that we view science in the usual 
referential way in which “when an object stands in a referred-to relation, we can accept the 
existence claims along with the resulting commitments to related properties and claims18. Thus, 
NOA suggests that science should be allowed to “speak for itself” which makes science 
intelligible as it satisfies our intuition that scientific practice is purely an objective activity 
without being realist or antirealist in perspective. Many have criticised Fine’s NOA. One of 
such critics is Alan Musgrave19 who accused NOA as essentially sold to realism and its 
deployment of “usual referential semantics” imply a particular theory of truth. For him, Fine 
distorts the manifold stance of antirealists in respect to their position of truth (or what Musgrave 
term the “core”). Fine’s NOA seems to be mistaken when he suggests that explanatory success 
of science is unconnected to its truth. In connection to this, Robert Klee20 and Richard Schlagel 
argued that the NOA is an inconsistent and implausible methodological orientation of science. 
Despite the criticisms, Arthur Fine’s NOA remains a useful interpretation for scientific practice 
as it provides a reconciliatory ground for the realist/antirealist debate on the nature of truth and 
objectivity in science. In addition, Fine points that although scientists may discover more facts 
and evidences about the empirical world, we must not approximate these advances in scientific 
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19 See Alan Musgrave, “NOA’S Ark – Fine for Realism”. The Philosophical Quarterly 39,157 (1989): 383-398.    
20 Robert Klee, Introduction to the Philosophy of Science: Cutting Nature at its Seams, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), 238. 
knowledge of an entity with what the entity itself is. Science, is but one of the many attempts 




Our discourse thus far can be tied together by emphasizing the usefulness of philosophical 
articulation of scientific research for both scientists and nonscientists. It unravels the infelicities 
and hidden assumptions of scientific inquiry in lieu of the prerequisite for the potentiality of 
empirical knowledge. As such, the growth of scientific knowledge is ensured by a continuous 
epistemological assessment of its basic assumptions and methodological activities. 
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